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Abstract 
This paper extends previous literature by assessing the drivers of tax effort in a large panel of 122 
countries over the period 1980 to 2017 and refining the analysis to regions, periods, income group, and 
economic development level. Our focus is on five blocks of determinants, namely: economic, fiscal, 
openness, structural, and political. We find that tax effort is influenced by all blocks, although results 
differ per income group. Tax effort in advanced economies is driven by all blocks of drivers, except 
political variables, while openness, structural, and political blocks prevail in developing economies. 
There is no consistency regarding the determinants across the four regions (Latin America, Africa, 
Europe and Asia). We also find that during the first two decades under analysis, tax effort is mainly 
associated with both higher levels of countries’ tax revenues and the role of the agricultural sector in 
the economy, while from 1999 onwards the determinants are mainly driven by left-wing ruling 
governments and the economic and fiscal blocks of variables. Our results are robust for a battery of 
sensitivity and robustness tests. Taken all together, our findings suggest the existence of heterogeneous 
impacts, which implies that policies resulting in improvements in the level of tax effort can affect 
countries in different ways. 
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There is a longstanding debate regarding the drivers of tax revenues and tax effort (Gupta, 2007). 
Tax effort can be defined as an index of the ratio between the share of actual tax collection in gross 
domestic product and taxable capacity, the tax capacity being “the predicted tax-to-gross domestic 
product ratio that can be estimated empirically, taking into account a country’s specific 
macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features, which all change through time” (Le et al., 
2012). Countries all over the world have been concerned with tax revenues and fiscal constraints 
(Arellano & Bai, 2017). On the one hand, a strong pressure exists regarding government spending, 
both for social expenditures, such as education, health, and pensions (Jimenez, 2017), and also for the 
need for public investments, particularly to address infrastructure gaps (Bacchiocchi et al., 2011; 
Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016). On the other hand, increasing attention is being paid to the 
sustainability of public finances, particularly in contexts of low economic growth (Afonso & Jalles, 
2012). This has all led to the increasing importance for governments to raise revenues. Nevertheless, 
a high fiscal burden can be perceived to be an obstacle for economic development and growth (Afonso 
& Jalles, 2014) and accordingly, increasing tax revenues without a high level of tax effort is considered 
to be an essential element of fiscal policy. As a result, understanding the drivers of tax effort is of 
extreme relevance, particularly for policymakers.  
The literature on the drivers of tax effort has been mainly focused on the economic and demographic 
aspects, although certain institutional issues should also be considered relevant. From the economic 
point-of-view, the main drivers of tax effort are the GDP growth and GDP per capita (Frank, 1959; 
Bird, 1964; Rivero et al., 2001; Gupta, 2007), although Gross Domestic Income is also perceived to 
be relevant (Lortz & Morss, 1967; Chelliah et al., 1975; Piancastelli, 2001). For both the economic 
and demographic cases, countries with a higher level of development tend to have higher taxation and 
tax effort levels. Furthermore, higher participation of agriculture in GDP tend to reduce the tax capacity 
(Balh, 1971; Chelliah et al., 1975; Piancastelli, 2001). Economies with a higher level of openness – 
i.e., with more trade – tend to have lower levels of tax efforts (Gupta, 2007; Pessino & Fenochietto, 
2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013). In addition, a better institutional environment, such as low 
corruption and better rule of law, tend to improve tax performance and reduce the tax burden (Bird et 
al., 2008). Unlike previous studies (Gupta, 2007; Bird et al., 2008; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013), we 
include an extensive list of determinants, focus on a larger time span, including a broader sample 
comprising 122 countries, and refine the analysis to regions, periods, income group and economic 
development. The determinants are grouped into five blocks, and we assess each block's relevance, 
individually and collectively, in explaining cross-country variability in tax effort. Our paper 
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contributes to the existent literature as we show different results considering these idiosyncrasies that 
were not taken together to date.  
Our data covers a large panel of 122 countries over the period 1980 to 2017 and is sourced from the 
OECD database, the World Economic Forum, the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), and the 
World Bank´s World Development Indicators (WDI). Two alternative tax effort measures are 
computed (the Frank and Bird indexes) for the largest available number of countries and years. The 
focus is on five blocks of determinants, namely: economic, fiscal, openness, structural, and political. 
We start to construct our baseline specification by using the standard fixed-effects model for each 
block of determinants and later drop any insignificant variables from the full specification with all 
determinants. This parsimonious process set our benchmark specification, which was narrowed down 
to geographical region (Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Asia), income group (advanced economies, 
and developing economies), and time period (1980 to 1998, and 1999 to 2017). 
Overall, tax effort is influenced by all groups of determinants, although the results differ per income 
group. Tax effort in advanced economies is driven by all blocks of drivers, with the exception of 
political variables, which are not relevant. However, the three blocks for openness, structural, and 
political issues prevail in developing economies. Consistency is also absent for the drivers of tax effort 
across the four regions. Conversely, and in contrast to all other regions, Africa's tax effort is not 
associated with the economic, fiscal, and openness drivers. From 1980 to 1998, the level of tax effort 
is mainly associated with higher levels of a country’s tax revenues and the role of the agricultural 
sector in the GDP. Since that period, the determinants of tax effort are mainly driven by left-wing 
ruling governments and by the economic and fiscal blocks of determinants. The results are robust to a 
large number of robustness checks. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it shows that tax effort is time sensitive 
and depends on the economic development of each country. Second, the income group shapes tax 
effort differently, and this finding was not addressed in previous studies. Bird et al. (2008) have 
focussed on high-income countries. Gupta (2007) split the analysis by income level, although it did 
not account for political variables. We demonstrate that political variables shape the tax effort 
differently depending on the level of economic development. Overall, the key contribution of this study 
comes from using a larger sample and time span than main studies in this field while including at the 
same time a more extensive list of determinants and also narrowing our analysis to groups (regions, 
periods, income group, and economic development level) that show that different idiosyncrasies matter 
in explaining cross-country tax effort variability. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 
3 develops the conceptual framework underlying the empirical model. Section 4 discusses the data and 
presents some stylised facts, and Section 5 discusses the econometric results. The last section 
concludes and highlights critical policy implications.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The OECD defines tax revenues as being “the revenues collected from taxes on income and profits, 
social security contributions, taxes levied on goods and services, payroll taxes, taxes on the ownership 
and transfer of property, and other taxes. Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP indicates the 
share of a country’s output that is collected by the government through taxes.”. The tax burden is 
measured by considering total tax revenues received as a percentage of GDP (Sarmento, 2018). 
However, countries have different tax capacities, according to their level of GDP, income, openness 
to trade, and institutional quality (Gaspar et al., 2016). Tax capacity is measured as the predicted tax-
to-gross GDP ratio that a country can support, considering the specific macroeconomic, demographic, 
and institutional characteristics (Le et al., 2012). We can assess tax effort as a derivative of tax revenues 
and tax capacity. Tax effort is, therefore, the ratio between tax revenues as a percentage of GDP and 
the tax capacity. It is important to refer that a simple comparison of tax revenues as a share of GDP 
can be misleading, as it ignores differences in tax capacity across the countries in question (Mertens, 
2003).   
The main studies on tax effort are summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix. Based on the seminal 
works of Frank (1959) and Bird (1964) – which were the first to define tax capacity and tax effort – 
studies have evolved into more complex and comprehensive studies. Most studies use a data sample 
of several countries for an extended period. For example, Lotz & Morss (1967) used 72 countries to 
assess tax capacity. For the period of 1963 to 1965, Tanzi (1968) used data from the US, Canada, and 
European countries. Balh (1971) used a similar period (1966-1968), but for a total of 49 low-income 
studies, and Chelliah et al. (1975) also used 47 low-income countries with data from 1969 to 1971. 
More recent studies include that of Rivero et al. (2001), which used 14 European countries, with data 
ranging from 1967 to 1995, and that of Mertens (2003), which analysed the ten central and eastern 
European countries from 1992 to 2000. Worldwide country analyses (using both developed and less 
developed countries) are provided by Piancastelli (2001), Gupta (2007), Bird et al. (2008), Pessino & 
Fenochietto (2010), and Fenochietto & Pessino (2013). 
5 
 
Studies on tax effort are mainly divided into two large groups: i) those which compare and evaluate 
tax effort across several countries, most of whom use a cross-section of data, which ignores time-
variation, although some use a sample period (Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 
2013); and ii) those that analyse the potential drivers of tax efforts. Of these, we can divide the main 
drivers of tax effort into tax, income, economic structure, population, and institutional environment. 
Table A2 in the Appendix summarises the main drivers of tax effort, authors, expected effect on tax 
effort, and the main findings related to each driver.  Table A2 in the Appendix shows that tax effort 
determinants can be divided into five large blocks, namely: economic, fiscal, open economy, structural, 
and political.  
GDP and GDP per capita are used to measure the economic drivers of tax effort, with some authors 
(Lotz & Morss, 1967 or Chelliah et al., 1975) using GDI (Gross Domestic Income) and GDP per capita 
instead. In addition, Tanzi (1968) uses personal income (total and per capita). More developed 
countries – measured as countries with a high GDP or GDI per capita – tend to have a higher level of 
taxation and tax revenues, which is primarily due to a higher level of expenditures (mainly social 
expenditure, i.e., on pensions, health, or education. Accordingly, greater tax revenues levels tend to 
lead to a higher tax effort, even when considering the above-mentioned effect of large tax capacity.  
The fiscal determinants are mainly: per capita taxes, taxes as a percentage of GDP, and the total 
amount of tax revenues. Most authors (Frank, 1959; Bird, 1964; Tanzi, 1968 or Rivero et al., 2001) 
found evidence that a higher level of tax revenues and tax collection increases the pressure on 
taxpayers, which in turn leads to a higher tax effort. However, as more developed countries tend to 
have a large tax capacity due to their strong and richer economies, this effect can reduce the tax effort.  
Openness of the economy is also a relevant block of tax effort. A higher level of trade tends to reduce 
tax effort. This is due to several factors: i) a larger volume of exports generate better profits and creates 
more employment, which in turn lead to greater tax revenues; ii) in most cases, imports are taxed more; 
iii) trade liberalisation leads to an improvement in customs procedures and also greater tax revenues 
(Keen & Simone, 2004; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006). Nevertheless, Baunsgaard and Keen (2010 found a 
weaker relationship for low-income countries, even though they discovered a positive and significant 
relationship between trade and revenue for high- and middle-income countries.  
The economic structure of a country is also related to its capacity to collect taxes and consequently 
influence tax effort (Piancastelli, 2001). Studies show that countries with higher participation of 
agriculture in the GDP tend to have a higher tax effort (Balh, 1971; Chelliah et al., 1975; Mertens, 
2003; Gupta, 2007). Agriculture tends to be rudimentary and is characterised by the predominance of 
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small farmers – especially in less-developed countries (Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013). This means that 
the majority of the economic agents involved are less prone to pay their fair share of taxes and that it 
is also more difficult for the tax administration to collect these revenues (Rajaraman, 2004). As a result, 
the other sectors share the tax burden to a large degree (Rajaraman, 2004). In less-developed countries, 
the agriculture share of tax revenues is lower than the percentage of GDP, and consequently, tax 
performance is weaker (Akitoby et al., 2020). On the contrary, mining and industry tend to reduce tax 
effort (Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013). In the case of mining, the high 
level of revenues – especially during a commodity price boom – tend to be highly taxed, which 
generates revenues which, in turn, enable tax authorities to reduce the tax burden on the other sectors.  
Population also has a role in the level of tax effort. Balh (2004) found evidence that countries with a 
faster-growing population tend to have a low level of tax effort, and Bird et al. (2008) also found 
evidence of such an effect. Nevertheless, it is crucial to consider that countries with a growing 
population tend to be low-income countries, and therefore the low level of tax effort could be more 
related to this factor.  
Finally, the institutional quality of the country is a crucial aspect of the level of tax effort. Countries 
with a better institutional framework – which is reflected by low corruption, a better rule of law, or 
better government efficiency – tend to be characterised by less tax effort (Grigorian & Davoodi, 2007; 
Gupta, 2007; Bird et al., 2008; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013). Overall, 
these authors refer that a higher level of informal economy and tax evasion leads to a higher tax effort. 
The ability of a large proportion of taxpayers being able to evade their tax obligations naturally leads 
to the need for the tax burden to be shared by a reduced number of agents. Argentiero et al. (2020) 
elaborate on how corruption levels are positively related to tax evasion. Authors such as Bird et al. 
(2008) argue that in the case of low-income countries, improving government institutions is the best 
root to improve their tax collection, as such an improvement provides a better level of development 
than natural resources do. The authors claim that high-income countries also have the potential to 
enhance their tax performance through having better institutions. Despite this, some studies in the 
literature stress the repercussions of the lack of administrative capacity to enforce taxation in 




3. Conceptual Framework and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
To implement our analysis, we compute two measures of tax effort based on the seminal works of 
Frank (1959) and Bird (1964). The two measures are still relevant today, despite recent attempts to 
define more comprehensive indexes by also including economic development and the degree of 
openness (Lotz and Morss, 1967), foreign trade (Bahl, 1971), the intensity of the use of specific taxes 
(Bahl, 1972; ACIR, 1988), and frontier production possibilities (Aigner et al., 1977). Frank (1959) 
proposed a measure of ‘tax sacrifice’, which captures the effects of differences in population and 
personal income. In Equation (1), the measure of tax effort starts with the tax burden in the numerator 
and then accounts for the ability to pay taxes: 






)] × 100 (1) 
where, T is tax revenues, Y is the gross national product, and Y/P scales the gross national product by 
population (P). 
Later, Bird (1964) added that the numerator in Frank’s measure fails to consider the effort to produce 
the income. In addition, Bird (1964) also challenges Frank’s inclusion of gross national product, rather 
than gross domestic product – which better assesses performance in open economies. Nevertheless, 
the formulation of Bird’s index only changed the numerator part. The index proposed in this research 
uses disposal income to compute tax burden: 






)] × 100 (2) 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
We empirically investigate the impact of different blocks of drivers on two alternative measures of 
tax effort computed for the largest available number of countries and years. This means that our 
unbalanced panel sample includes xx countries from 1980 to 2017. The analysis is further narrowed 
by geographical region (Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Asia), income group (AE - advanced 
economies, and DEV - developing economies, including EME - Emerging Market Economies, and 
LICS - Low-Income Countries), and time period. The following reduced-form equation is estimated, 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) initially: 
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 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
where the 𝑦𝑖𝑡 dependent variable denotes tax effort (from either the Frank or Bird Index) in the country 
i and time t and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable included in the dynamic model later on (cf. 
robustness section). 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡, 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 are the blocks of drivers that correspond 
respectively to the economic, fiscal, open-economy, structural, and political economy determinants of 
tax burden. Building on previous research (Frank, 1959; Rivero, 2001; Tanzi, 1968; Bird, 1964); Balh, 
1971; Gupta, 2007; Bird et al., 2008; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013),  
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡 specifically includes the following variables: log of real GDP per capita; growth in real GDP, 
and the output gap (measured as the gap between potential and real GDP). In turn, 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 includes tax 
revenues and the country’s fiscal balance, both as a percentage of GDP. The openness of economies 
(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡) is captured by trade openness (measured as the exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP), 
fiscal openness (measured by the World Bank as the commitments and implementation of fiscal 
transparency actions), and exchange rate stability. The block of structural drivers (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖,𝑡) includes the 
log of population density, the share of the agricultural sector in the economy, and the Gini index. To 
conclude, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 includes a variable to capture the political orientation of the government (Left), the 
political timing (Horizon), the degree of political fragmentation (Cohesion), and government 
accountability – see below for details. 
These control variables enter with a one-year lag in order to minimise reverse causation issues. The 𝜂𝑖 
and 𝜇𝑡 coefficients denote the country-specific effects to capture time-invariant unobserved factors 
and the time effects controlling for common shocks (such as the global business cycle) that could affect 
fiscal conditions across all countries in a given year, respectively. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term 
which satisfies the standard assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. To account for possible 
heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
 
4. The Data 
4.1 Tax Burden Indices 
Figures 1.a and 1.b illustrate the level of tax effort worldwide, ranked from 0 to 30. While most of 
the advanced economics lie within the 0 to 1 range, Europe shows more variability, especially when 
looking at Bird’s index. This measures captures the effort to produce income, and it highlights that 
southern European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain), Belgium and France exhibit 
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above average values, with the exception of the Baltic countries and a few in the Balkans. Asia shows 
no relevant variability in tax effort levels. 
Figure 1.a Tax Burden across the World, 2017 (using Frank´s Index) 
 
 
Figure 1.b Tax Burden across the World, 2017 (using Bird´s Index) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of both indexes since 1980. The gap decreased consistently over 

















However, the gap was not similar between advanced and developing economies (see Figure A4. in the 
Appendix). Figures A1. to A3. in the Appendix show the evolution of Frank’s and Bird’s index per 
country. Interestingly, Japan presents an inversion of the tax effort trend within the group of advanced 
economies. When looking at Emerging Market Economies (EME) and Low-Income Countries (LCIS), 
more distinct patterns can be observed. In Figure 3, we report the distribution of the Frank and Bird 
indexes, which shows that the dispersion is significantly greater for developing economics. 
Figure 2. Evolution of Frank and Bird indices over time, all countries 
Frank Index Bird Index 
  
Note: interquartile range, plotting the median and first and third quartile of the respective distribution. 
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4.2 Political and Institutional Drivers 
To test the role of political and institutional variables in driving the tax burden, as discussed in the 
previous sub-section, we propose an approach which relies on a principal component analysis (PCA), 
with variables grouped around three political dimensions, namely: ideology, electoral proximity, and 
political strength. Data on political economy variables are retrieved from Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) (Cruz et al., 2018). 
Ideology: this dimension captures whether a ruling government is left-wing or not. The DPI 
original “chief executive party orientation (execrlc)” value takes three discrete values: 1 for right-
wing parties, 2 for central, and 3 for left. We define “left” as taking the value 1 if “execrlc” takes 
the value 3, and zero otherwise. 
 
Electoral proximity: this dimension takes into account the time available to policy-makers before 
forthcoming elections. Politicians facing elections can have higher or lower incentives to 
implement certain tax reforms, depending on the tax area, vested interests, and constituency voting 
support. We use three variables to compute the proximity to elections PCA. Higher electoral 
proximity is associated with a longer length of time in office for the party of the chief executive, a 
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the current term. The first principal component is retained, as this factor explains 60% of the 
variance in the standardised data (see Table A3). 
 
Political strength: represents a dimension which captures the number of political actors 
participating in fiscal decisions, which typically tend to exhibit conflicting demands. These actors 
could be parties in government (or in opposition), interest groups, or, more generally, veto players. 
Strong governments are those which operate in less fragmented political environments. We use 
four variables to compute the strength PCA, where more political strength is associated with a high 
margin of parliamentary majority, executive control of all houses, and a weak opposition which is 
measured by a larger number of parliamentary seats and voting share of the ruling government. 
Only the first principal component is retained, as it explains more than 54% of the variance in the 
standardised data (see Table A3). 
 
Political Accountability: is a dimension which considers the institutional context in which fiscal 
policy decisions are made. Politicians tend to be more responsive to citizen’s demands and more 
accountable to voters for the promises they make when they operate in contexts typified by more 
transparency, better governance, and a larger number of mechanisms designed to monitor their 
activities objectively. In such contexts, politicians operating in institutional contexts with more 
accountability are associated with greater fiscal discipline and lower promise gaps. We use four 
variables to compute the accountability PCA. A higher accountability index is associated with 
more voice and accountability, with greater regulatory quality, more government effectiveness, 
and less corruption. Only the first principal component is retained (see Table A3).   
 
Table A3 in the Appendix lists the corresponding factor loadings and uniqueness for the PCAs, 
which, as an example, can be interpreted as follows: in the case of political strength, the resulting factor 
appears to mostly describe the margin of majority and control of all houses, as indicated by their lower 
uniqueness. 
Given that PCA is based on the classical covariance matrix, which is sensitive to outliers, we take a 
preliminary step by basing it on a robust estimation of the covariance (correlation) matrix. A well-
suited method is the Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD), which considers all subsets containing 
h% of the observations and estimates the variance of the mean on the data of the subset associated with 
the smallest covariance matrix determinant – for which we implement Rousseeuw and Van Driessen's 
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(1999) algorithm. After re-computing the same indices with the MCD version, we mainly obtain 
similar results, which infers that outliers are not driving our factor analysis. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Baseline 
As a baseline, we estimate Equation (1) using the standard fixed-effects model and start with a 
specification which includes only macroeconomic variables in Column (1) of Table 1 as a point of 
reference. We then present parsimonious specifications with alternative blocks of drivers organised by 
topic and enter them independently in Specifications (2) until (6). Specification (7) includes all blocks 
of drivers placed together in a single regression. While these results demonstrate a relatively consistent 
picture, we consider the model in Column (8) - which was obtained from dropping insignificant 
variables from Specification (7) one at a time - as our benchmark specification. 
The dependent variables in Table 1 and Table 2 are the Frank index and the Bird index, respectively. 
The results are very similar for the two proxies of tax effort, although with one exception. The Gini 
index is associated with higher tax effort for the Frank index, while it is not relevant for the Bird index. 
In fact, the latter differs by accounting for the effort to produce income, thus making the measure of 
income inequality not relevant in explaining tax effort. We observe that countries with higher taxes as 
a percentage of GDP and a higher fiscal balance experience higher tax effort. This result is consistent 
for both measures of tax effort and also with the role of tax effort in achieving fiscal consolidation. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
The results suggest the existence of higher tax effort for more open economies which are more 
sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. The works of Lotz & Morss (1967), Balh (1971), Chelliah et 
al. (1975), Mertens (2003), Bird et al. (2008) all documented that openness exerts a negative effect on 
tax effort, although some other studies suggested that the opposite effect, which is arguably due to 
import taxes (Gupta, 2007; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013). Consistent 
with Bird et al. (2008), tax effort increases population density, although the level of income can shape 
this relationship, as we discuss below. 
Increasing real GDP is associated with higher tax effort. However, contrary to most empirical 
evidence (Frank, 1959; Gupta, 2007; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013), real 
GDP per capita appears to drive down countries’ tax effort. Bird et al. (2008) documented that more 
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developed countries have a greater tax capacity and accordingly support the need to narrow the analysis 
in the next section to geographical region and income group. 
 
5.2 Sensitivity 
We performed sensitivity analyses by income group (Table 3), geographical location (Table 4), and 
time period (Table 5). The sensitivity analysis results by income group show that there are only two 
consistent determinants of tax effort: real GDP per capita and population density. The results for other 
economic and fiscal drivers of tax effort only hold similar to the base case for advanced economies. 
The relevance of the agricultural sector in developing economies increases tax effort. However, this 
association is negative for advanced economics, which is explained by the role of the agricultural sector 
on output per capita. Overall, tax effort in advanced economies is driven by all blocks of drivers, except 
for political variables, while in developing economies, the level of tax effort is influenced by the 
openness, structural, and political blocks of drivers. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The sample is further narrowed in Table 4 to geographical location, namely: Latin America, Africa, 
Europe, and Asia. Overall, there is no consistency of drivers of tax effort across the four regions. Tax 
effort in African countries is not associated with economic, fiscal, and openness drivers. African 
countries show lower tax effort for a higher density of the population in the cases of countries governed 
by left-wing political parties and also for countries exhibiting a high weight of the agriculture sector 
in the economy. Latin American countries share similarities with African countries, although the Gini 
index, economic, and fiscal blocks of drivers need to be added to those cited above for African 
countries. The Gini index plays a role in the level of tax effort for regions with a concentration of more 
inequality countries. In fact, the Gini index is only relevant for the Latin America region. The 
inequality index is highly concentrated above 40 for most Latin American countries, while it is not 
uniform throughout the African region and is relatively lower in most countries in all other regions. 
The Europe and Latin America regions share most economic drivers, although with opposing 
associations, namely: increase in GDP per capita, lower real GDP growth, and smaller output gap are 
all associated with lower tax effort in Europe, although they are higher for Latin America. The block 
of fiscal variables is relevant for explaining variability in tax effort in the Asia region, together with 
financial openness and the contribution of the agriculture sector. 
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[Insert Table 4] 
Table 5 shows the results for two time periods – 1980 to 1999 and 1999 to 2017. During the first 
period, tax effort is mainly associated with higher levels of both the level of tax revenues per country 
and the role of the agricultural sector in the GDP. Turning to the next two decades, drivers differ 
significantly as countries' economic and social development evolve, whereby determinants of tax effort 
are now mainly driven by the economic and fiscal blocks of variables. The GDP growth is associated 
with higher tax effort, although it is offset by the prosperity of economies measured by per capita GDP. 
The relevance of left-wing ruling governments emerged in the second period – which acts as a 
determinant of decreasing tax effort. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
5.3 Robustness 
We began the empirical analysis with the standard fixed-effects model, which provided consistent 
and robust results. However, the model represented by Equation (1) is the reduced-form version, which 
therefore renders it impossible to make causal statements, or even quantifying the clean effects of 
certain drivers on the tax burden. Adding covariates partly corrects for these biases. However, 
endogeneity can still arise from other omitted variables (unobserved heterogeneity and selection 
effects), measurement errors in variables, and reverse causality (simultaneity). As causality can run in 
both directions, some of the right-hand-side regressors can be correlated with the error term. However, 
due to the potential for the existence of endogeneity and the persistence of tax burden indices, we 
check the sensitivity of our baseline results by estimating the static model with the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimator. We use lagged regressors as instruments (up to two lags), which are 
validated by the Kleibergen-Paap and Hansen statistics.5 Furthermore, we use the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) approach developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) to estimate the dynamic version of our model – even though the GMM system approach 
is a very demanding estimator, especially with when using a limited number of unbalanced 
observations. The system GMM approach involves constructing two sets of equations, one with first 
differences of the endogenous and pre-determined variables instrumented by suitable lags of their own 
                                                          
5 When looking at the diagnostic statistics to assess the validity of the instrumental variable strategy, the 
underidentification test p-values generally reject the null that the different equations are underidentified. In addition, the 
Hansen test statistics reveal that the instrument sets contain valid instruments (i.e., instruments which are uncorrelated 
with the error term, and those that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation). 
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levels, and the other with the levels of the endogenous and pre-determined variables instrumented with 
suitable lags of their own first differences. We apply the one-step version of the GMM system 
estimator to ensure the robustness of the results, as the standard errors from the two-step variant of the 
GMM system method are known to be downward biased in small samples. 
The use of all available lagged levels of the variables in the GMM estimation leads to a proliferation 
in the number of instruments, which reduces the efficiency of the estimator in finite samples, and can 
potentially lead to over-fitting. A further issue is that the use of many instruments significantly 
weakens the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions, and therefore the detection of over-
identification is harder when it is most needed. Conversely, however, restricting the instrument set too 
much results in a loss of information, which in turn leads to imprecisely-estimated coefficients. 
Accordingly, the estimation of such models involves a delicate balance between maximising the 
information extracted from the data on the one hand, and guarding against over-identification on the 
other hand. To this end, we follow the strategy suggested by Roodman (2009) to deal with the problem 
of weak and excessively numerous instruments. We also validate the GMM system identification 
assumptions by applying a second-order serial correlation test for both the residuals and the Hansen J-
test for the overidentifying restrictions. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) in the respective 
tables are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in the first-differenced 
equation. As expected, we find evidence for high first-order autocorrelation, but no evidence for 
significant second-order autocorrelation. Similarly, the Hansen J-test result indicates the validity of 
internal instruments used in the dynamic model estimated via the GMM system approach. 
Finally, we also consider the Mean Group (MG) estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) and the Pooled 
Mean Group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999). Both the MG and PMG are appropriate for 
analysing dynamic panels which have both large time and cross-section dimensions. Furthermore, they 
have the advantage of accommodating both the long-run equilibrium and the possibly heterogeneous 
dynamic adjustment process. These estimators enable correcting for the potential bias, resulting from 
estimating tax buoyancy coefficients when using standard fixed-effects models in the presence of 
nonstationary error terms, which imposing parameter homogeneity would introduce into the estimating 
equation. 
Results for the robustness analysis using the entire sample are presented in Table 6, which contrasts 
with the results in Tables 1 and 2. For The role of real GDP per capita in shaping countries’ tax effort 
is reinforced in all estimations, as documented by Bird et al. (2008), although the results are contrary 
to other studies (Frank, 1959; Gupta, 2007; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Pessino & Fenochietto, 
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2013). We also observe that fiscal balances increase countries’ tax effort, as in the baseline estimation. 
The battery of robustness tests also yields better clarification regarding the influence of the Gini index 
in explaining tax effort, although it is now robust across the two dependent variables used in our study. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we evaluated the determinants of tax effort in a sample of 122 countries over the period 
of 1980 to 2017. The focus is on five groups of determinants, namely: economic, fiscal, openness, 
structural, and political. We begin our analysis by looking at the entire sample. Next, we narrow the 
analysis by geographical region (Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Asia), income group (advanced 
economies, and developing economies), and time period (1980 to 1998 and 1999 to 2017). 
Our main findings are summarised as follows. Tax effort is influenced by all groups of determinants, 
although the results differ per income group. All blocks of groups of determinants explain tax effort in 
advanced economies – except the block of political variables – while in developing economies, the 
level of tax effort is mainly influenced by the open structural and political blocks of drivers. Overall, 
there is no consistency of drivers of tax effort across the four regions. Economic and fiscal 
determinants are relevant for Europe and Latin America, although in opposite directions. Conversely, 
none of the economic, fiscal, and openness drivers determines tax effort in Africa, with the relevant 
determinants for these regions being the density of population, weight of the agricultural sector, and 
political drivers.  
Determinants of tax effort also differ in function of each of the time periods. On the one hand, tax 
effort is mainly associated with higher levels of countries’ tax revenues and the role of the agricultural 
sector in the GDP during the first period (1980-1998). However, on the other hand, in the second 
period, relevance of left-wing ruling governments emerged as a determinant of decreasing tax effort, 
together with the relevance of the economic and fiscal blocks of variables. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it shows that tax effort is time sensitive 
and depends on each country's economic development. Second, the income group shapes tax effort 
differently, and this finding was not extensively addressed in previous studies. Bird et al. (2008) have 
focussed on high-income countries. Gupta (2007) split the analysis by income level, although it did 
not account for political variables. We demonstrate that political variables shape tax effort differently 
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depending on the level of economic development. Overall, this study’s key contribution comes from 
using a larger sample and time span than main studies in this field while including at the same time a 
more extensive list of determinants and also narrowing our analysis to groups (regions, periods, income 
group, and economic development level) that show that different idiosyncrasies matter in explaining 
cross-country tax effort variability. 
Our findings have four main policy implications. First, tax effort is a relevant measure of fiscal 
policy, however it has limitations. It is easy to collect and provides a simple overview of tax trends 
over countries. However, countries with different levels of development and income should be 
considered with caution and the best solution is to consider the impact of each block of determinants 
mainly in the same income group. Second, in the case of high-level income countries, as all blocks of 
determinants are relevant, countries should have a holistic view of their tax system. In addition, high-
income countries have the potential to improve their tax efficiency by improving their institutions. 
Third, if countries outside the high-level income group want to potentiate their tax revenues, then they 
need to consider changes in their openness and the structural aspects of their economy. Fourth, political 
and institutional drivers are becoming increasingly more relevant. 
Future research should consider a finer decomposition of the tax burden, using Frank´s index 
approach by tax category (personal, corporate, goods and services). Another avenue of research could 
also consider the economic (and distributional) consequences of big increases in tax burden, which are 
defined as a binary variable that could take the value 1 if the annual change in the index was larger 
than each country´s time-series average plus one standard deviation. This would identify years of major 
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Table 1. Baseline: Frank Index - OLS  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables          
Real GDP (log) 3.9552***      6.6160*  
 (0.588)      (3.641)  
Real GDP pc (log) -8.1783***      -10.4814*** -4.6661*** 
 (0.787)      (3.720) (0.496) 
Real GDP growth 4.5236***      0.3803 1.9768* 
 (1.431)      (1.275) (1.133) 
Inflation rate  2.1349      -0.7948  
 (1.846)      (1.733)  
Output Gap 0.0514***      0.0169 0.0411*** 
 (0.015)      (0.013) (0.012) 
Growth Forecast -0.0203      0.0176  
 (0.043)      (0.029)  
Tax pc (log)  -2.8826***     -0.3541  
  (0.421)     (0.276)  
Tax (%GDP)  0.0526***     0.0338*** 0.0285*** 
  (0.015)     (0.010) (0.007) 
Public Debt (%GDP)  -0.0193***     -0.0001  
  (0.004)     (0.002)  
Fiscal Balance (%GDP)  -0.0185     0.0288*** 0.0173*** 
  (0.012)     (0.009) (0.007) 
Trade Openness    0.7225***    0.4351 0.3269* 
   (0.204)    (0.287) (0.198) 
Terms of Trade   0.1360    -0.4027  
   (0.129)    (0.269)  
Financial Openness   -1.2281***    -0.0391 0.6297*** 
   (0.219)    (0.194) (0.181) 
Exchange rate stability   -1.2070***    -0.5413** -0.3849** 
   (0.208)    (0.210) (0.151) 
Monetary Independence   0.3984*    0.0842  
   (0.226)    (0.148)  
Financial Crises   -0.0385    0.0807  
   (0.191)    (0.112)  
Population density (log)    -6.0174***   2.7629 5.4213*** 
    (2.198)   (3.225) (0.737) 
Labor force (log)    4.5871***   -0.2166  
    (1.083)   (0.876)  
Agriculture (%GDP)    0.0863***   -0.0320 0.0752*** 
    (0.032)   (0.047) (0.028) 
Services (%GDP)    -0.0089   -0.0135  
    (0.022)   (0.020)  
Gini (disp.inc)    9.5888***   1.2246 4.0867** 
    (2.232)   (2.127) (1.774) 
Left     -0.1010** 0.0089 -0.0699*** -0.0175 
     (0.040) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) 
Horizon1     -0.3027*** -0.0248 0.0645 -0.2766*** 
     (0.061) (0.048) (0.047) (0.064) 
Cohesion     0.2595 -0.1924 1.1737*** 0.5741* 
     (0.196) (0.338) (0.420) (0.327) 
Accountability       -1.2853*** -0.0842  
      (0.256) (0.227)  
         
Observations 1,709 1,376 3,466 1,913 2,518 1,383 649 1,162 
R-squared 0.7865 0.7735 0.6954 0.7636 0.7274 0.8813 0.9235 0.8997 
Note: The dependent variable is the Frank Index. Robust standard errors in brackets. The outliers are excluded, namely the 
top 5% of Frank and Bird indices distributions, respectively. Country and time fixed effects are included, but are omitted 





Table 2. Baseline: Bird Index - OLS  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables          
Real GDP (log) 6.6362***      8.3178  
 (0.808)      (5.483)  
Real GDP pc (log) -12.5423***      -14.4502*** -6.6941*** 
 (1.123)      (5.557) (0.727) 
Real GDP growth 5.8019***      1.2386 2.8943* 
 (1.841)      (1.927) (1.625) 
Inflation rate  2.5859      -0.5998  
 (2.181)      (2.589)  
Output Gap 0.0657***      0.0313 0.0594*** 
 (0.020)      (0.021) (0.017) 
Growth Forecast -0.0061      0.0133  
 (0.052)      (0.045)  
Tax pc (log)  -3.8572***     -0.2698  
  (0.573)     (0.418)  
Tax (%GDP)  0.0897***     0.0516*** 0.0458*** 
  (0.023)     (0.015) (0.010) 
Public Debt (%GDP)  -0.0242***     0.0000  
  (0.005)     (0.003)  
Fiscal Balance (%GDP)  -0.0253     0.0456*** 0.0298*** 
  (0.016)     (0.014) (0.009) 
Trade Openness    0.8051***    0.5977 0.4753* 
   (0.255)    (0.433) (0.289) 
Terms of Trade   0.0851    -0.5569  
   (0.143)    (0.416)  
Financial Openness   -1.7570***    -0.1332 0.7644*** 
   (0.282)    (0.294) (0.245) 
Exchange rate stability   -1.5190***    -0.7912** -0.6843*** 
   (0.260)    (0.317) (0.209) 
Monetary Independence   0.5640*    0.1196  
   (0.299)    (0.225)  
Financial Crises   -0.0640    0.0783  
   (0.243)    (0.166)  
Population density (log)    -6.1792**   4.7866 8.1081*** 
    (2.956)   (4.856) (1.067) 
Labor force (log)    5.8131***   -0.0638  
    (1.460)   (1.328)  
Agriculture (%GDP)    0.0967**   -0.0720 0.0714* 
    (0.040)   (0.072) (0.038) 
Services (%GDP)    -0.0185   -0.0165  
    (0.029)   (0.030)  
Gini (disp.inc)    10.4189***   0.1712 3.7901 
    (3.047)   (3.306) (2.492) 
Left     -0.1333** 0.0247 -0.0962*** -0.0208 
     (0.053) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) 
Horizon1     -0.3925*** -0.0242 0.0787 -0.3501*** 
     (0.081) (0.064) (0.071) (0.082) 
Cohesion     0.3604 -0.1537 1.7809*** 0.9297** 
     (0.248) (0.429) (0.647) (0.472) 
Accountability       -1.7098*** -0.0465  
      (0.347) (0.332)  
         
Observations 1,709 1,376 3,466 1,913 2,518 1,383 649 1,162 
R-squared 0.8077 0.7639 0.6871 0.7525 0.7108 0.8679 0.9116 0.8968 
Note: The dependent variable is the Bird Index. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The outliers are excluded, namely 
the top 5% of Frank and Bird indices distributions, respectively. Country and time fixed effects are included, but are omitted 





Table 3. Sensitivity: Frank and Bird Index – OLS by income group  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Frank Frank Bird Bird 
Income group AE DEV AE DEV 
Variables      
Real GDP pc (log) -7.0596*** -2.4031*** -10.3648*** -3.2610*** 
 (0.605) (0.557) (0.910) (0.727) 
Real GDP growth 3.9041*** -0.2315 5.0267*** 0.0003 
 (1.051) (1.818) (1.620) (2.512) 
Output Gap 0.0598*** -0.0039 0.0874*** -0.0004 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
Tax (%GDP) 0.0386*** 0.0065 0.0612*** 0.0197 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.010) (0.034) 
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 0.0364*** 0.0041 0.0570*** 0.0115 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.022) 
Trade Openness  1.1718*** -0.4094 1.7528*** -0.5588 
 (0.224) (0.349) (0.338) (0.480) 
Financial Openness -0.0304 1.4028*** 0.0239 1.5797*** 
 (0.124) (0.318) (0.201) (0.422) 
Exchange rate stability -0.5887*** -0.0788 -1.0110*** -0.1445 
 (0.153) (0.246) (0.232) (0.332) 
Population density (log) 7.6925*** 4.7012*** 11.4558*** 6.2270*** 
 (0.664) (1.198) (0.993) (1.681) 
Agriculture (%GDP) -0.1077** 0.0947*** -0.1969*** 0.1138*** 
 (0.046) (0.030) (0.070) (0.041) 
Gini (disp.inc) -0.0867 2.9377 -1.2200 2.2388 
 (1.606) (2.176) (2.550) (2.995) 
Left -0.0052 0.0048 -0.0085 0.0154 
 (0.018) (0.048) (0.028) (0.061) 
Horizon1 0.0260 -0.5319*** 0.0401 -0.6789*** 
 (0.035) (0.094) (0.054) (0.119) 
Cohesion 0.5232 1.2183** 0.9799* 1.6006** 
 (0.373) (0.562) (0.577) (0.759) 
     
Observations 688 474 688 474 
R-squared 0.9256 0.9259 0.9230 0.9219 
Note: The dependent variable is the either the Frank or the Bird Index. The robust standard errors are in brackets. The 
outliers are excluded, namely the top 5% of Frank and Bird indices distributions, respectively. Country and time fixed 
effects are included, but are omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical 




Table 4. Sensitivity: Frank and Bird Index – OLS by geographical region  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Frank Frank Frank Frank Bird Bird Bird Bird 
Region Latin America Africa Europe Asia Latin America Africa Europe Asia 
Variables          
Real GDP pc (log) 0.8971** 2.0296 -7.3616*** -0.2055 1.2520** 3.5767* -11.0858*** -0.1753 
 (0.396) (1.237) (0.673) (0.189) (0.528) (1.955) (1.004) (0.260) 
Real GDP growth -2.7187* -2.1839 3.4479*** -0.4214 -3.7043* -3.9181 4.5904** -0.5763 
 (1.394) (2.829) (1.223) (0.470) (1.955) (4.438) (1.864) (0.676) 
Output Gap -0.0366*** -0.0155 0.0629*** -0.0036 -0.0528*** -0.0303 0.0946*** -0.0028 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.007) (0.019) (0.044) (0.021) (0.010) 
Tax (%GDP) 0.0824*** -0.0139 0.0330*** -0.0192** 0.1436*** -0.0208 0.0515*** -0.0297** 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.046) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) 
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) -0.0114 0.0044 0.0347*** 0.0135*** -0.0144 0.0102 0.0546*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.007) 
Trade Openness  -0.0925 0.2009 1.1795*** -0.0577 -0.1484 0.2324 1.6575*** -0.0559 
 (0.246) (0.268) (0.320) (0.063) (0.341) (0.424) (0.483) (0.094) 
Financial Openness -0.3195 0.0242 0.1257 0.4145*** -0.5258* -0.1025 0.2434 0.5576*** 
 (0.230) (0.310) (0.152) (0.151) (0.316) (0.494) (0.238) (0.211) 
Exchange rate stability 0.2835 -0.4221 -0.8098*** 0.0110 0.3740 -0.7343 -1.2901*** 0.0005 
 (0.232) (0.398) (0.150) (0.069) (0.316) (0.647) (0.225) (0.109) 
Population density (log) -2.2734*** -5.9368*** 8.0483*** -0.3829 -2.7240** -7.1459** 11.5598*** -0.5931 
 (0.790) (1.622) (1.011) (0.308) (1.114) (2.587) (1.518) (0.439) 
Agriculture (%GDP) -0.0563*** -0.0581* -0.0196 0.0199*** -0.0790*** -0.0914* -0.0721 0.0237** 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.057) (0.007) (0.027) (0.050) (0.089) (0.010) 
Gini (disp.inc) 12.2224*** 4.4996 2.0634 0.0876 15.1202*** 6.9319 1.5744 -0.0852 
 (2.109) (3.023) (2.125) (0.949) (2.894) (4.939) (3.380) (1.398) 
Left -0.0491* -4.7953** -0.0400* 0.0029 -0.0448 -5.4869* -0.0555 0.0078 
 (0.026) (1.680) (0.023) (0.017) (0.034) (2.688) (0.036) (0.025) 
Horizon1 0.0312 -0.2162** 0.0251 -0.0168 0.0444 -0.3675** 0.0279 -0.0168 
 (0.057) (0.091) (0.045) (0.014) (0.078) (0.146) (0.068) (0.021) 
Cohesion 0.4228 2.7674* 1.1379** -0.2556* 0.5929 4.5485* 1.7111** -0.3516* 
 (0.344) (1.481) (0.451) (0.134) (0.475) (2.366) (0.690) (0.193) 
         
Observations 206 49 571 136 206 49 571 136 
R-squared 0.9753 0.9984 0.9228 0.9681 0.9682 0.9980 0.9188 0.9665 
Note: The dependent variable is the either the Frank or the Bird Index. The robust standard errors are in brackets. The 
outliers are excluded, namely the top 5% of Frank and Bird indices distributions, respectively. Country and time fixed 
effects are included, but are omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term is omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical 




Table 5. Sensitivity: Frank and Bird Index – OLS by time period  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Frank Frank Bird Bird 
Time period 1980-1998 1999-2017 1980-1998 1999-2017 
Variables      
Real GDP pc (log) 0.0246 -3.9766*** 0.3646 -5.6642*** 
 (1.408) (0.530) (1.970) (0.769) 
Real GDP growth -2.3432 2.6107*** -3.5873 3.6983*** 
 (1.710) (0.859) (2.373) (1.197) 
Output Gap -0.0355* 0.0218** -0.0571** 0.0326** 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.028) (0.015) 
Tax (%GDP) 0.0400*** 0.0086 0.0569*** 0.0180* 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.020) (0.010) 
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) -0.0088 0.0108** -0.0117 0.0203*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.019) (0.007) 
Trade Openness  0.7552 -0.1248 0.7493 -0.1305 
 (0.558) (0.200) (0.728) (0.300) 
Financial Openness 0.0950 0.0179 0.1789 -0.0788 
 (0.223) (0.166) (0.324) (0.238) 
Exchange rate stability -0.2105 -0.1652 -0.4142 -0.2968 
 (0.202) (0.161) (0.287) (0.227) 
Population density (log) -4.0539 6.1490*** -5.5306 8.8226*** 
 (2.878) (0.842) (3.832) (1.218) 
Agriculture (%GDP) 0.3023*** 0.0239 0.3491*** 0.0076 
 (0.063) (0.018) (0.082) (0.025) 
Gini (disp.inc) 3.1376 1.9428 4.1789 1.1211 
 (3.408) (1.675) (4.562) (2.402) 
Left 0.0228 -0.0473*** 0.0146 -0.0632** 
 (0.035) (0.017) (0.054) (0.025) 
Horizon1 -0.1370* -0.0591 -0.1582 -0.0730 
 (0.083) (0.049) (0.112) (0.068) 
Cohesion -0.5606 0.9931*** -0.5085 1.4063*** 
 (0.454) (0.326) (0.671) (0.467) 
     
Observations 249 913 249 913 
R-squared 0.9870 0.9308 0.9864 0.9253 
Note: The dependent variable is the either the Frank or the Bird Index. The robust standard errors are in brackets. The 
outliers are excluded, namely the top 5% of Frank and Bird indices distributions, respectively. Country and time fixed 
effects are included, but ae omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term is omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical 




Table 6. Robustness: Frank and Bird Index – alternative estimators, all countries  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable Frank Frank Frank Frank Frank Bird Bird Bird Bird Bird 
Estimator TSLS Diff-GMM Sys-GMM MG PMG TSLS Diff-GMM Sys-GMM MG PMG 
Variables            
Real GDP pc (log) -4.5922*** -2.9200** -0.5595*** -2.6130*** -1.2872** -6.7203*** -4.4252*** -0.8230*** -3.7618** -2.0038** 
 (0.185) (1.119) (0.084) (0.973) (0.559) (0.262) (1.615) (0.121) (1.815) (0.939) 
Real GDP growth 3.1778*** 1.4969 3.1020 1.1317 0.3646 4.7780*** 2.0097 4.5113 1.4531 0.3780 
 (0.674) (1.744) (2.432) (0.872) (0.296) (0.955) (2.483) (3.394) (1.361) (0.553) 
Output Gap 0.0344*** 0.0325 0.0418 0.0162* -0.0064 0.0505*** 0.0432 0.0648 0.0266* -0.0183 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.029) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.033) (0.042) (0.014) (0.017) 
Tax (%GDP) 0.0215*** 0.0067 -0.0017 0.0310** 0.0356 0.0340*** 0.0224 -0.0074 0.0503** 0.0630* 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.029) (0.013) (0.023) (0.009) (0.032) (0.043) (0.022) (0.037) 
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 0.0141** -0.0130 -0.0272 0.0115** 0.0121 0.0241*** -0.0135 -0.0368 0.0230*** 0.0365* 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.031) (0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.021) (0.043) (0.008) (0.022) 
Trade Openness  -0.0165 -0.7702* -1.0264*** 0.1544 0.3066 -0.0271 -1.1078* -1.6181*** 0.1953 0.5036 
 (0.145) (0.437) (0.381) (0.159) (0.272) (0.205) (0.644) (0.528) (0.250) (0.498) 
Financial Openness 0.5020*** -0.4786 -1.2144** -0.7123** -0.2169* 0.5546*** -0.6730 -1.8303** -0.9221 -0.4030* 
 (0.115) (0.417) (0.549) (0.357) (0.134) (0.163) (0.570) (0.787) (0.609) (0.245) 
Exchange rate stability -0.3210*** 0.0324 -0.2422 0.0596 0.3058** -0.6291*** -0.0354 -0.2958 0.0489 0.4787** 
 (0.109) (0.196) (0.542) (0.071) (0.142) (0.155) (0.312) (0.777) (0.113) (0.214) 
Population density (log) 4.4313*** 1.0192 0.1535 -4.6124 -0.3347 6.5138*** 2.8126 0.2675 -6.5249 0.0140 
 (0.368) (3.352) (0.118) (2.968) (0.754) (0.521) (4.477) (0.176) (5.146) (1.177) 
Agriculture (%GDP) 0.0498*** 0.1240** 0.0555 0.0058 0.0346 0.0379* 0.1852** 0.0740 0.0139 0.0721 
 (0.015) (0.053) (0.065) (0.016) (0.036) (0.021) (0.081) (0.093) (0.028) (0.064) 
Gini (disp.inc) 4.1043*** 10.6360** -2.0022 -1.4397 -0.6764 3.5108** 16.5095** 5.4346* -2.4869 -0.8501 
 (1.235) (4.731) (2.135) (1.120) (0.430) (1.749) (6.929) (3.177) (1.877) (0.698) 
Left 0.0072 0.0278 0.1241 -0.0122 -0.0206 0.0190 0.0339 0.1608 -0.0285 -0.0320 
 (0.031) (0.109) (0.140) (0.013) (0.024) (0.044) (0.150) (0.199) (0.025) (0.041) 
Horizon1 -0.3810*** -0.0190 0.1572 0.1335 -0.0650** -0.4878*** -0.0347 0.2296 0.2003 -0.1284** 
 (0.065) (0.123) (0.144) (0.117) (0.033) (0.093) (0.176) (0.212) (0.165) (0.063) 
Cohesion 1.0367** 0.2150 -0.5532 0.0098 -0.3329 1.6446*** 0.2324 -0.8186 0.0253 -0.6222 
 (0.432) (0.505) (1.192) (0.340) (0.352) (0.611) (0.739) (1.632) (0.598) (0.611) 
           
Observations 1,129 1,100 1,184 901 901 1,129 1,100 1,184 901 901 
R-squared 0.5559     0.5684     
Note: The dependent variable is the either the Frank or the Bird Index. The robust standard errors are in brackets. The 
outliers are excluded, namely the top 5% of Frank and Bird indices distributions, respectively. Country and time fixed 
effects are included, but are omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term is omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical 
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Figure A4. Evolution of Frank and Bird Indices over time, by income group 
Frank Index Frank Index 
Advanced Economies Developing Economies 
  
Bird Index Bird Index 
Advanced Economies Developing Economies 
 
 
















































Table A1 Literature review 
This table presents the main literature on tax efforts. In the tax effort calculations: T stands for taxes, and Y stands for GDP. IT is total income tax revenue.  
GDI stands for Gross Domestic Income. GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product. Openness economy is calculated as the sum of exports and imports divided by tGDP. 
Corruption is an index measured by the World Bank (ranging from 0 – worst, to 100 – best). Voice and Accountability is an index which is measured by the World Bank, which 
considers perception of democracy, freedom of expression, association, and media (ranging from 0 – worst, to 100 – best). 
Author Country/Region Period Methodology Dependent variables Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Frank 
(1959) 
US 1953-1957 Frank index 
Frank index (tax 
effort) 
 Per capita taxes 
 Tax as % of GDP 
 Tax revenues 
 GDP 
 GDP per capita 
 Methodology used to understand the main 
determinants of tax effort 





1962 Bird index Bird index (tax effort) 
 Tax revenues 
 GDP per capita 
 GDI 
 Low-income countries tend to have higher tax 
effort 
 More robust results than the Frank index, by using 




72 countries  
Lotz-Morss 
equation 
Tax capacity  
 
 GDI 
 GDI per capita 
 Economy openness 
 Low-income countries tend to have higher tax 
effort 














 Tax revenue 
 Personal income 
(Y’) 
 Personal income 
per capita (Y”) 










 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Exports/Imports 
 GDP 
 A greater share of agriculture in GDP reduces tax 









 GDI per capita 
 Economy openness 
 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Despite the general increase in tax ratios in 
developing countries, the average level of taxation is 
still lower than that in developed countries 
 The differences between developing and developed 
countries are more significant if total taxes are 







US (State level) 1960-1991 
Time series 
regressions 





 GDI per capita 
 A change in the index over time indicates a 








of tax effort 
in EU 















 Considerable convergence in the EU between 
1967-1974, but lower convergence between 1984-
1995 (with a divergence between 1974-1984)  












Also uses Lotz-Morss 
and Tanzi equations 
 GDI per capita 
 Economy openness 
 Industry as % GDP 
 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Degree of literacy 
 Both GDP per capita and trade increase tax effort 
 Agriculture share increases tax effort in medium 
and low-income countries 
Mertens 
(2003) 










Also uses Lotz-Morss 
and Tanzi equations 
 Industry as % GDP 
 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Imports as % of 
GDP 
 Substantial variations in tax effort among CEE 
countries 
 Agriculture share increases tax effort 
Gupta 
(2007) 





Tax revenues as a % 
of GDP 
 GDP per capita 
 Economy openness 
 Foreign aid 
 Corruption 
 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Several factors increase revenues: GDP growth, the 
share of agriculture in GDP, and trade openness 
along with foreign aid.  
 Several institutional factors decrease revenues 
potential: more corruption and political instability. 
 Countries that depend on taxing goods and services 
as their primary source of tax revenue tend to have 
poorer revenue performance. 
 Countries perform better which place greater 
emphasis on taxing income, profits, and capital gains 
Bird et al. 
(2008) 
121 countries 1998-2000 
OLS 
2SLS 
Tax share as % of  
GDP 
 GDP per capita 
 Population growth 
 Economy openness 
 Corruption 
 Voice and 
accountability 
 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Better institutions improve tax performance 
 Tax effort is determine to a significant extent by 
extending the conventional model of tax effort by 
showing that not only do supply factors matter, but 
also that demand factors such as corruption, voice 




& Pessino  
( 2013) 




Ratio between actual 
revenue and tax 
capacity 
 GDP per capita 
 Economy openness 
 Income distribution 
 Inflation 
 Levels of education 
 Corruption 
 Agriculture and 
mining as % of GDP 
 Countries should analyse the efficiency of their tax 
effort before implementing new taxes or increasing 
the rate of the existing ones  
 A positive and significant relationship exists 
between tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and the 
level of development (per capita GDP), trade 
(imports and exports as percentage of GDP), and 
education (public expenditure on education as a 
percent of GDP). 
 A negative relationship exists between tax revenue 
as a percentage of GDP and inflation (CPI), income 
distribution (GINI coefficient), the ease of tax 
collection (agricultural sector value-added as a 
percentage of GDP), and corruption. 
35 
 
Table A2 Main drivers of tax effort 
This table presents the main drivers of tax effort in the literature. In the results on tax effort, the “+”signal indicates 
that the variable increases the tax effort, the “-“ signal shows that the variable reduces the tax effort, “n.s” means 
that the variable is not significant, and “n.a” indicates that the variable was used to calculate the tax effort, but no 
specific result regarding the variable was obtained.  
 
Main driver Authors Results on 
tax effort 
(+/-; n.s; n.a) 
Main findings 
Economic determinants 
GDP Frank (1959) + 
 More developed countries have higher 
tax revenues, mainly due to large 
expenditures on social functions 
  More developed countries tend to 
have a higher tax effort 
Nevertheless, more-developed countries 
also have more tax capacity than less- 
developed ones, which can reduce the 
effect on tax effort 
 Balh (1971) + 
 Rivero (2001) n.a 
GDP per capita Frank (1959) + 
 Bird (1964) + 
 Gupta (2007) + 
 Bird et al. (2008) - 
 
Fenochietto & Pessino 
(2013) 
+ 
GDI Bird (1959) + 
 Lotz & Morss (1967) + 
 Berry & Fording (1997) n.a 
GDI per capita Lotz & Morss (1967) + 
 Chelliah et al. (1975) + 
 Berry & Fording (1997) n.a 
 Piancastelli (2001) + 
Personal income 
(total & per capita) 
Tanzi (1968) n.a 
Fiscal determinants 
Per capita tax Frank (1959) + 
A higher level of tax revenues naturally 
leads to an increase in tax effort, 
although tax capacity can mitigate tax 
effect 
Tax % GDP Frank (1959) + 
 Rivero (2001) n.a 
Tax revenues Frank (1959) + 
 Bird (1964) + 
 Tanzi (1968) n.a 
Other determinants (open economy, structural and political) 
Openness 
economy 
Lotz & Morss (1967) - 
A more-open economy (i.e., more 
exports and imports as a % of GDP) 
tends to have less tax effort. 
However, some studies show the 
opposite effect, mainly due to taxes on 
imports 
Balh (1971) - 
Chelliah et al. (1975) - 
Piancastelli (2001) + 
Mertens (2003) - 
Gupta (2007) + 
Bird et al. (2008) - 
Fenochietto & Pessino 
(2013) 
+ 
Agriculture as % 
GDP 
Balh (1971) + Studies are consensual that countries 
with a higher share of agriculture in GDP 
tend to have more tax effort 
 
This is mainly the effect of agriculture 
activities – particularly in less-developed 
countries – which tend to be more 
difficult to tax, leading to more tax effort 
in the other sectors 
Chelliah et al. (1975) + 
Piancastelli (2001) + 
Mertens (2003) + 
Gupta (2007) + 
Bird et al. (2008) + 





Gupta (2007) - A better institutional environment – with 
low corruption and a better rule of law – 
tends to reduce tax evasion, which leads 
to less tax effort 
Bird et al. (2008) - 





Table A3: Factor Loadings and Uniqueness 
Variables Factors Uniqueness 
 proximity strength accountability  
Longer length of time of party in office  0.84   0.28 
Higher number of years available for the 
Chief Executive in office 0.84  
 0.29 
Years left in the current term 0.02   0.48 
Margin of majority  0.88  0.21 
Executive control of all houses  0.86  0.25 
Government voting share  0.32  0.89 
government number of seats  0.71  0.49 
Voice and accountability   0.95 0.08 
Regulatory quality   0.97 0.07 
Government effectiveness   0.96 0.09 
Control of corruption   0.87 0.24 
% explained 0.60 0.53 0.88  
 
